



    Performance management has been emphasized in Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries since 1980’s, 
following the New Public Management (NPM) movement.  Performance 
management focuses on managers’ i.e. career civil servants’ i) clear objectives 
of management, ii) managerial autonomy on resources, and iii) ex-post 
appraisal on performance, putting strong focus on outputs and outcomes.
    In this paper the author would like to discuss on i) the use of performance 
appraisal for managers, ii) the use of performance related pay as an incentive 
to improve performance, and iii) the impact of performance management on 
human resource development.
    The paper begins with the review of several theories on performance 
management and performance-related pay. The first and most influential 
one is the management by objectives and self-control advocated by Drucker. 
Others are theory of expectancy advocated by psychologist such as Lawler 
and Vroom, principal-agent theory in economics and goal setting theory 
advocated by Locke.
    Then the paper turns its focus to the OECD countries’ experience, based 
on the outputs of OECD Public Governance Committee’s Network on Public 
Employment and Management, the author participated in, and shows some 
implication for Asia and the Paciﬁc.
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NPM Movement and Performance Appraisal
    NPM movement initially emerged in the beginning of 1980’s, mainly 
in Commonwealth nations (especially, United Kingdom (UK), Australia, 
New Zealand (NZ) and Canada) and some state and local governments in 
the United States (US).  Two key features of  NPM are largely composed 
of i) introduction of new management ideas into the public sector, and ii) 
introduction of market entity or other actors into production and distribution 
of goods and services produced by the public sector in order to improve 
efﬁciency through (market) competition (Aucoin 1991, Hood 1991, Osborne 
and Gaebler 1992).
    One of the major initiatives included in the former category mentioned 
above is the delegation of managerial decision-making authority or autonomy 
from the minister, vice-minister or the center of the government to the 
managers of line ministries, who are in charge of provision of specific 
goods and services the government provides to the general public. Major 
managerial autonomy delegated here is usually related to ﬁnancial disposition 
and human resource management (sometimes one of these two components 
influences the other, though).  In turn, those line managers are forced to 
show their achievement or performance in the light of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness.  Usually they have to promise what to do (achieve) ex ante, 
then after the time-period determined in advance, they are forced to measure 
performance ex post with indicators.  From time to time program evaluation 
shall be conducted in order to verify the validity of performance indicators, 
including the causal relationship of the performance measured through 
indicators to the impact to the society and economy in general.  Agenciﬁcation 
trend in the OECD countries is related to these ideas.  In an executive agency, 
specific functions with single or minimal number missions are split out 
organizationally, the head (or executive board) has high level of ﬁnancial and 
human resource management autonomy, and the agency has to set ex ante 
performance indicators and targets and has to have the achievement of the 
targets measured , which results in the reward or negative sanction.
    The initiatives included in the latter category is, for example, contracting-
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out (the extreme case of this is market-testing or compulsory competitive 
tendering), voucher, public- private partnership (in UK and nations inﬂuenced 
by it the term “private ﬁnance initiative” is used), user charges, transferable 
permits, and privatization of government enterprises as a whole.  Also, 
utilizing non-profit organizations (civil society organizations in OECD 
terminology) and non-governmental organizations (this term used usually 
in international context), or empowering local communities and committing 
themselves to the provision of the goods and services which previously the 
public sector had provided can be sorted to this category because this might 
break the government monopoly of the provision of public goods and services 
(OECD 2005b: 129-155).
    This paper mainly focuses on the former, i.e. the improvement and reform 
of the efﬁciency and effectiveness of core government establishments, which 
has not been and cannot be substituted by the private or non-proﬁt sectors.
    Before proceeding to the main topic of this paper “human resource 
development”, the relationship shall be examined between organizational 
performance and that of individual career of ficials.  The original aim of 
NPM movement is organizational; after the 2 consecutive oil crises and 
stagﬂation caused by them (and some countries faced currency crisis or loss 
of commonwealth tariff privilege), most OECD countries had to struggle for 
“doing more with less”.  They have less tax revenue and expanding public 
deficit and public debt under the stagnant economy and soaring inflation. 
They needed to stimulate economy but they did not have enough financial 
resource for them.  Thus they tried to enhance ef ficiency and economy 
through new management ideas.  Some of them are Ibbs “Next Steps” report 
in UK or “Government Management” report in NZ.
    However, organizations are the tools with which a number of people’s 
efforts are consolidated and coordinated to one or few directions in order 
to obtain more results than the sum of the efforts of individuals without 
organization.  Therefore in order to improve organizational performance we 
have to look at two constructs; one is the mechanism or framework with which 
an organization works effectively, in other words “coordination mechanism”. 
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The other is the way an individual member of an organization can maximize 
his/her efforts according to the organization’s direction (mission).
    Human resource development side of NPM plays the indispensable role in 
the latter side; enhancing individual members’ capability in the organization. 
In the following sections, this paper turns the focus on human resource 
development side in NPM reform for organizations under core executive 
(ministries or departments).
Major Theories Supporting Performance Appraisal
(a ) Management Science: Drucker’s “Management by Objectives and Self 
Control”
    The first management scientist who advocates the importance of goal 
(objectives) setting and ex post measurement might be Drucker in his early 
book The Practice of Management (Drucker 1954: 121-136).  He insisted that 
any business enterprise must weld individual efforts into a common goal, 
their efforts must direct to the same direction, and their contribution must ﬁt 
together to produce a whole without gaps, friction, unnecessary duplication 
of effort.  Thus each job, especially each manager’s job, must be focused on 
the success of the enterprise.  Thus the manager must know the business 
goals demanded to him and his superior must know the contribution of the 
manager and judge him.
    Drucker mentioned three patterns of misdirection; managers in charge of 
specialized workers do not care about whole goal of the enterprise;  superiors 
make misdirection in the hierarchical structure of management; and various 
levels of management, which is insulated each other, has different vision and 
work.
    In order to break such obstacles he advocated the introduction of 
“management by objectives and self-control” into management of an 
enterprise or company.  In his proposal of “management by objectives and 
self-control”, he mentioned ﬁve tips:
1 ) The objectives of every manager should spell out his contribution to the 
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attainment of company goals in all areas of the business.
2 ) Proper management requires balanced stress on objectives, especially 
by top management, thus it shall rule out “management by crisis” or 
“management by drives (campaigns)”.
3 ) A manager is responsible for the contribution that his component makes to 
larger unit above him and eventually to the enterprise.  This requires each 
manager to develop and set the objectives his unit himself, and this is his 
primary responsibility, even though higher management must reserve the 
power to approve (or disapprove) these objectives. Further, every manager 
should have responsibility to participate in the development of the objectives 
of the higher unit he belongs to because he must know the ultimate business 
goals, expectation to him, and why, what his works be measured against 
how.  This also produces mutual understanding between the superiors and 
the subordinate managers, which can never be produced by hierarchical 
“communications down”.
4 ) “Self-control” and “control from above” shall be distinguished. To be able 
to control his own performance a manager needs to know more than what 
his goals are. He must be able to measure his performance and results 
against the goals.  It should indeed be an invariable practice to supply 
managers with clear and common measurements in all key areas of business. 
These measurements need not be rigidly quantitative; nor need they be 
exact.  But they have to be clear, simple and rational.  They have to be 
relevant and direct attention and efforts where they should go.  They have to 
be reliable, at least to the point where their margin of error is acknowledged 
and understood.  They have to be self-announcing, understandable without 
complicated interpretation or philosophical discussion.  Each manager 
should have the information he needs to measure his own performance 
and should receive it soon enough to make any changes necessary for the 
desired results.  This information should go to the manager himself, not to 
superior (not a tool of control from above). Within the limits of unethical, 
unprofessional or unsound behavior the company limits, every manager must 
be free to decide what he has to do, and only if he has all the information 
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regarding his operations he can fully be held accountable for results.
5 ) Reports and procedures should focus only on the performance needed to 
achieve results in key areas.  They should be the tools of the man who ﬁlls 
them out.  A man must never be judged by the quality of the production of 
forms he ﬁlls out; he must always be judged by his production of performance.
(b) Economics: Agency Theory
(1) Principal Agent Theory in General
    In the most simple form, principal-agent theor y (or agency theor y) 
discusses two people, i.e. one principal and one agent, the latter of whom 
makes decisions on behalf of the former.  These two do not necessarily have 
the same incentives.  The principal can be assumed to prefer to maximize his 
utility.  On the other hand, the agent might have his own incentives apart from 
his principal’s one, such as to expand the agent’s original wealth.  Further 
there might be asymmetry of information between two of them.  Assume the 
principal is the owner(s) of a company and the agent is the chief executive 
ofﬁcer of the company.  The agent has information on the management of the 
company, but the principal does not.  In order to align incentives of them, i) 
the principal needs remedial measures for asymmetry of information and/
or ii) the principal needs to construct the agent’s reward structure through 
which the agent’s incentive can be aligned to the principal’s one (Dauma and 
Schreuder 1991, Kikuchi 2006).
(2 ) Niskanen’s “Budget Maximizing Bureaucracy” as an Application of 
Principal-Agent Theory
    Niskanen’s approach is an application of principal-agent theory to the 
Government as well as an application of public choice theory, which intends 
to analyze political decision-making through economic approach, i.e. 
methodological individualism developed by such as Buchanan and Tullock 
(Niskanen 1971).
    In Niskanen’s theory it is assumed that the Congress (which represents 
the general public) and the career bureaucrats with life-long tenure are in the 
game relationship competing for the desired level of the public service the 
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bureaucrats provide.  Also assumed that compared to the amount (quantity) of 
the public service, the cost of the public service is increasing and the beneﬁt 
of the public service is diminishing.  The reward of the bureaucrats (not 
only monetary rewards but also fame, perks and privileges accompanying to 
the position) is positive linear function of the cost.  Figure 1 is the graphical 
presentation of his model.
P: Price of the Public Service
Q: Quantity of the Public Service
TB: Total Beneﬁt
TC: Total Cost  
NB: Net Beneﬁt of the General Public (=TB-TC)
    In his model the most efﬁcient amount of the public service is Q1, where 
the benefit of the general public is maximized.  However, because of the 
Figure 1   Niskanen’s Model
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asymmetry of information, i.e. the bureaucrats monopolize the information on 
cost and beneﬁt of the public service, the Congress cannot but accept the level 
of the public service proposed by the bureaucrats unless the cost exceeds 
the beneﬁt, thus the resulting level of the provision goes up to inefﬁcient Q2. 
Niskanen’s analysis might be one of the bases for personnel appraisal for the 




    Expectancy theory advocated by Vroom is composed of 2 propositions. 
In proposition 1, “the valence of an outcome to a person is a monotonically 
increasing function of the algebraic sum of the products of the valences of all 
other outcomes and his conceptions of its instrumentality for attainment of 
these other outcomes.”  In proposition 2, “the force on a person to perform 
an act is a monotonically increasing function of the algebraic sum of the 
products of valences of all outcomes and the strength of his expectancies that 
the act will be followed by the attainment of these outcomes”. Expectancy is 
a probability that an act produces the attainment of an outcome.  Although 
the concept of valences and instrumentality are similar to the concept of 
utility as both are subjective, this formularization gives us some suggestion 
of “instrumental” role of performance appraisal and performance-related pay 
(Vroom 1964: 14-19).
    However, Vroom mentioned in the same book that job satisfaction is 
negatively related to turnover and absences, but it is much less clear why 
job satisfaction should result in greater productivity (Vroom 1964: 175-187). 
Frederic Herzberg, in the book published in the end of 1950’s, through 
empirical survey, proposed “motivation-hygiene theory” (Herzberg 1959: 113-
119).  Achievement, recognition, advancement, responsibility and work itself 
are significantly frequent events which increase job satisfaction (motivation 
factors), but on the other hand, company policy and administration, 
supervision, salary, interpersonal relations and working conditions are 
49巻１号　（2014. ７）　（　　）146
講　　演（　　）９
signiﬁcantly frequent events which decrease job satisfaction (hygiene factors). 
Deci, in 1970’s, expanded the research on intrinsic motivation and the effect 
of externally mediated rewards (Deci 1975). Here we have to be careful that 
salary itself might not necessarily secure improvement of motivation.
    Lawler narrowly focuses on the relationship between pay and performance. 
He positively admits the effect of pay to performance, but reserve that there 
is conditions in which pay does not work effectively for performance (Lawler 
1971).
(2) Goal Setting Theory
    Since 1970’s Locke and Latham has advocated the positive relationship 
between goal setting and job performance (Locke and Latham 1984, Locke 
and Latham 2002).  They have emphasized the importance of difficulty and 
specificity of the goals.  As for monetary incentive, they are positive with 
some reservation.  First, more commitment requires more money.  Second, 
when the goal is very difﬁcult, paying people only if they reach goal can hurt 
performance.
Trend in OECD Countries
    In 2003 13 OECD countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Korea, NZ, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) and one 
observer country (at that time) (Chili) participated in case study research on 
performance-related pay scheme (OECD 2005a).
    The main ﬁndings were as follows;
・The decentralization of the scheme was not widespread,
・ There were some shift from the individual performance-related pay to 
collective one,
・The use of job objective as a criteria is increasing,
・ Rating quota became flexible and appraisal used as dialogue rather than 
control, and,
・The size of performance-related pay is relatively small to total pay.
    In the conclusions of OECD report the impact of the ﬁnancial incentive of 
performance-related pay appears to be limited and other incentives are more 
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influential for motivating employees, such as satisfactory job content and 
career development, which agrees most of theories mentioned above.
    The process accompanying performance-related pay has produced positive 
results as an impetus to improved goal setting, organizational culture change, 
management innovation and, thereby, to improved performance.  Objective 
setting has to be the centerpiece of the system, as Locke and Latham mentions 
(See Figure 2).
Situation in Japan
    In 2009 the Government of Japan started its performance appraisal system 
formally based on the Diet legislation in 2007 in order to enhance merit and 
performance in civil service system.  The system is composed of performance 
appraisal (management by objective and self-control system) biannually, and 
competency appraisal (behavioral and attitudinal appraisal) annually.
    The individual amount of bonus and annual pay raise has been determined 
based on the appraisal results since 2011.  The promotion of positions and pay 
grades has been determined based on the results since 2012.  It is too early 
Source: OECD 2005a: 82, Figure 3.2
Figure 2   The overall impact of performance-related pay on performance
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to evaluate the impact of performance appraisal and performance-related pay 
system in Japan.
Conclusion and Implication to nations in Asia and the Pacific
    Most of the theories and OECD experience might suggest the effect of 
performance appraisal or goal setting for the improvement of individual 
jobs and organizational management as a whole.  We should not too much 
emphasize the motivational effect caused by monetary incentives.
    Before introducing performance appraisal or performance management 
system, especially under the NPM environment with delegated authority and 
autonomy, there might have to have some organizational infrastructure as 
prerequisite;
・ transparency and trust of government, almost free from corruption and 
nepotism,
・ budgetar y provision adequate for constructing system and pay for 
performance,
・appraisal training for managers,
・ monitoring of system operation (adequate implementation of appraisals), and,
・ trust between the superiors and the subordinates because performance 
appraisal (and consecutive performance-related pay) works effectively as a 
communication tool between two rather than as a “carrot and horse” type 
monetary incentive.
Note:  This article is based on the author’s paper originally presented at the 
simultaneous workshop session (B1-2: Governability (Management)) of 
the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA) 
2013 Conference at Local Autonomy College in Tachikawa-city, Tokyo, 
Japan, in October, 17, 2013.
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